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1 INTRODUCTION
The notion of parental responsibilities is closely related to the evolution of
the legal position of the child. Historically, the legal position of the child has
evolved from being seen as the property of the parents, to a vulnerable indi-
vidual in need of protection to a rightholder in his/her own right.1 The initial
terminology of parental rights has also been gradually replaced by that of
parental responsibilities so as to reflect the subordination of the parents’
interests and rights to those of the children.2
It should be noted from the outset that there is no universal definition of
‘parental responsibilities’. In the EuropeanUnion ‘parental responsibility’ has
been interpreted to mean ‘all rights and duties relating to the person or the
property of a child which are given to a natural or legal person by judgment,
by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect. The term shall
include rights of custody and rights of access’.3 Pursuant to the Dutch Civil
Code (the ‘DCC’), parental authority comprises the duties and rights of parents
with regard to the care and upbringing of their child (Art. 1:247(1) DCC). Care
and upbringing include the care and responsibility for the child’s mental and
physical well-being, and fostering the development of its personality.
State authorities may limit or withdraw parental responsibilities. Such
limitations can be imposed via three different types of child protection orders,
M.R. Bruning is professor of Children and the Law, Leiden University. S. Florescu is PhD
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1 M.A. Mason, From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights: The History of Child Custody in the
United States, Columbia University Press New York1994; J.M. Eekelaar, ‘The Emergence
of Children’s Rights, 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1986, 161.
2 S. Lifshitz, ‘The Best Interests of the Child and Spousal Laws’, in: Y. Ronen, C.W. Green-
baum (ed.), The Case for the Child, Towards a New Agenda, Intersentia Antwerp 2008, p. 46.
3 Art. 2(7) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments inmatrimonial matters and
thematters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC)No 1347/2000, OJ L338/1,
2003.
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as follows: a supervision order, a care order for the discharge of parental
responsibilities,4 and an emergency care order.
This contribution analyses the concept of discharge of parental responsibil-
ities from the perspective of the Dutch Civil Code and the ECtHR.
Important legislative amendments to the DCC with regard to child pro-
tection orders (Arts. 1:254-278 DCC) that came into force on the first of January
2015 have led to a significant shift of legal conditions for discharge of parental
responsibilities. The legal conditions for discharging parents of their responsib-
ilities have been eased, so as to facilitate the possibilities for courts to impose
such measures.
Until 1 January 2015 the legal conditions for discharge of parental respons-
ibilities were focused on parental behaviour or parental failure (is a parent
a ‘good enough parent?’). Article 1:266 DCC referred to the parent being ‘unfit
or unable to fulfil the duty of caring for the child or its upbringing’. Relevant
case law underscored the use of a discharge order as a measure of last resort.5
As long as parents accepted that their child was living in alternative care with
a supervision order, a discharge order was not legitimized.
The intention of the legislator with the recent amendments was to shift
the attention from the parent(s) to the child. It is, however, important to assess
whether the newly introduced conditions to discharge of parental rights are
in line with the right to respect for family life of parents and child as is guar-
anteed in Article 8 of the European Convention on Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms (the ‘ECHR’ or ‘Convention’). Does the new DCC take sufficient
account of the rights and interests of parents and children to stay together
without state interference as guaranteed under Article 8 ECHR? The assessment
of compliance with the ECHR is highly relevant from both a theoretical and
practical perspective. According to Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitu-
tion, international human rights treaties or provisions which by nature of their
content can be binding on everybody have binding power and shall take
precedence over national law. The substantive ECHR provisions are directly
enforceable in Dutch practice6 and there have been several situations where
the Netherlands had to change either its laws or its practice following negative
rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (the ‘ECthR’ or ‘Court’).7
4 In this contribution the term ‘discharge of parental authority’ has been used. In the case-law
of the ECtHR the terminology used is usually ‘deprivation of parental responsibilities/
authority’.
5 HR 25 April 1997, NJ 1997/596; HR 7 April 2000, NJ 2000/563.
6 J.H. Gerards & J.W.A. Fleuren, Implementatie van het EVRM en de uitspraken van het EHRM
in de nationale rechtspraak, Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit 2013 (in opdracht van het
WODC), pp. 35-36.
7 Following Salduz/Turkey (ECtHR 27 November 2008, no. 36391/02) & Panovits/Cyprus
(ECtHR 11 December 2008, no. 4268/04) the Dutch Supreme Court on 30 June 2009 ‘imple-
mented’ the relevant conditions of the ECtHR with regard to juveniles’ right to counsel
during police interrogations (ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH3081) and following S.T.S./the Nether-
lands (ECtHR 7 June 2011, no. 277/05) the Dutch Supreme Court overruled the established
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Section 2 of this contribution focuses on the provisions of the DCC regarding
discharge of parental responsibilities. For a clearer picture of the recent legis-
lative changes, a brief outline of the relevant provisions of the ‘old’ DCC is
provided. Section 3 presents an overview of the ECtHR’s relevant case law, with
a focus on the aspects which are likely to have an impact on the Dutch situ-
ation. Finally, section 4 assesses the impact of the European case law on the
Dutch practice in the area of discharge of parental responsibilities.
2 DISCHARGE OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UNDER DUTCH LAW
The Dutch system of child protection as regulated in the DCC provides for three
possible measures: a supervision order, a care order or an emergency pro-
tection order. A supervision order entails the temporary limitation of parental
authority to a third person, without discharging the parents of their parental
responsibilities. It may be imposed with or without the placement of the child
in alternative care for amaximum of one year with the possibility of extension
for successive one-year periods. A care order entails that the legal parents are
discharged of parental responsibilities and a third party (natural or legal
person) will be granted the custody over the child. Finally, an emergency
protection order (emergency supervision order or emergency care order) may
be imposed for a maximum duration of three months.
Bill No. 32 015, in force as of 1 January 2015, amended the DCCwith respect
to the imposition of care and supervision orders. According to the explanatory
memorandum, this bill aims – in line with the UN Convention of the Rights
of the Child (‘CRC’) – to better protect children against parents who fail to bring
them up in a healthy and balanced manner.8
This section analyses the relevant provisions of the DCC with respect to
discharge of parental responsibilities. For a better understanding of the current
legislative framework, subsection 2.1. briefly illustrates the legal provisions
in force before 2015. Subsection 2.2. highlights the new legal concept of dis-
charge of parental responsibilities that was introduced on 1 January 2015.
2.1 Discharge of parental authority before 1 January 2015
Until 1 January 2015, the Dutch care order could be ordered by a court on two
different legal grounds: (1) if the parent was ‘unfit or unable to fulfil the duty
of caring for the child or its upbringing’ (Arts. 1: 266 and 268 DCC), or (2) on
case law of the Supreme Court with regard to the inadmissibility of an appeal if the court’s
authorization to a juvenile’s placement in alternative care had in the meantime lapsed (HR
24 June 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BQ2292; HR 14 October 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BR5151).
8 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 2.
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grounds of abuse, certain irrevocable criminal convictions, an improper way
of living, the serious disregard of the directions of the foundation responsible
for the protection of the child or the existence of a well-founded risk of neglect
of the best interests of the child because of the parent reclaiming or taking
back the child from other caregivers (Art. 1:269 DCC).9 As mentioned above
the imposition of a care order resulted in the deprivation of parental responsib-
ilities. The effect of discharge of parental authority, regardless of the ground
used, was that the parent could no longer take decisions with regard to the
upbringing of the child, whichwere entrusted to a third party.Where the court
is convinced that a minor may again be confided to the discharged parent,
it could reinstate such a parent with parental authority (Art. 1:277(1) DCC).
Therefore the option to regain parental authority was always open to parents.
Further, it is important to note that discharge of parental authority did
not entail a severance of ties between a child and its parents. Parents still had
the right to (request) contact and access, children remained their heirs, the
legal ties with their blood relatives such as grandparents remained equally
unchanged, and parents’ maintenance obligation to their children remained
intact. The Dutch child protection system did not include an adoption order
as themost far-reaching form of child protection, unlike many other European
countries. Although theoretically adoption could be used as a protection
measure, in practice it hardly happened. Adoption orders were only used for
cases when parents were no longer alive or consented to an adoption.
However, it should be stressed that the Dutch courts showed reluctance
to use the aforementioned care order and preferred ordering the other, less
intrusive measure, the supervision order, which was perceived as temporary,
to be discontinued as soon as the family reunification became possible.10 Even
when it was clear that the future of the child was not with the biological family
but in foster care, case law shows that the supervision order was often used
instead of a care order as long as parents consented to the placement in care
of their child.11 Courts perceived the care order – intended by the legislator
9 Until 1983 parents who were deprived of parental authority on the basis of intentional
(mis)behaviour lost their right to vote; this reflects the punitive nature of the child protection
order ‘ontzetting’ that was established over 100 years ago; this first child protection order
was introduced in 1905. The care order ‘ontheffing’ (unintentional behaviour) was later
introduced (in 1947). The supervision order was introduced in 1922 in combination with
the introduction of the children’s court judge.
10 Art. 1:262 DCC (until 1 January 2015 Art. 1:257 DCC) states that ‘the help and support of
the foundation shall be directed to ensure that the parent vested with parental authority
shall as much as possible remain responsible for the care and upbringing (section 2) and
shall foster the family ties between the parent and the minor (section 4)’.
11 See e.g. HR 8May 1992,NJ 1992/498; HR 25 April 1997,NJ 1997/596. Several (law) reviews
have criticized the use of supervision orders for long-term foster care placements; see e.g.
Met recht onder toezicht gesteld, Evaluatie herziene OTS-wetgeving, Utrecht: Verweij-Jonker
Instituut 2000 (law review supervision order); E.C.C. Punselie, Juridische haken en ogen, Den
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for situations in which it was clear that parents had no educational role in
the future upbringing of their child – as too far-reaching, too radical, and an
unnecessary punishment for parents. This led to a child protection practice
in which permanency planning for the child was rarely ordered.12 It should
also be recalled that, as stated above, a supervision order needed to be renewed
annually. Therefore, due to the preference for this measure to the care order,
children for whom it was clear that theywould not return to their legal parents
during childhood were faced with yearly court hearings and decisions. This
led to tensions for the child and the foster parents as well as for the legal
parents. All parties were uncertain about the situation of the child after another
year of supervision by the court-appointed YouthCareOfficewhichwasmade
responsible for the implementation of the supervision order.
The Dutch Supreme Court nuanced this approach only in 2008.13 It de-
cided that a stable parental consent to placement in foster care of the child
should be taken into account when deciding about a care order. However,
such consent should not always preclude courts from imposing care orders
while taking into account the child’s best interests with regard to stability and
continuity of his/her educational environment. The Supreme Court decision
can be seen as precursory to the relevant legislative amendments that came
into force on 1 January 2015.
Further, in practice the second type of care order provided for under Art.
1:269 DCC and based on the legal ground of intentional improper behaviour
of the parents (ontzetting) was hardly used. Instead, the courts preferred to
rely on the first ground, i.e. the parents’ unfitness for or inability of the appro-
priate upbringing of the child (provided for under Art. 1:268 DCC). The exist-
ence of the two different legal grounds and provisions for a care order was
therefore being questioned.14
Haag: Trillium 2000; Werkgroep wetgeving Beter Beschermd, Kinderen Eerst!, The Hague
2006 (governmental advisory group for the revision of child protection orders).
12 Until the 1980s the number of children faced with a supervision order or a care order was
almost similar (in 1980 around 10,000 children with a supervision order and 10,000 children
with a care order). As per 30 September 2012 the number of children faced with a super-
vision order (around 30,000 children) is four times higher than the number of childrenwith
a care order (around 7,500). See www.cbs.nl (search ‘Bijna 40 duizend kinderen onder
toezicht of voogdij’).
13 HR 4 April 2008, NJ 2008/506.
14 See e.g. the CommitteeWiarda 1971 (Commissie voor de herziening van het kinderbescher-
mingsrecht, Jeugdbeschermingsrecht, The Hague: Staatsuitgerij 1971; J.E. Doek, ‘De ontheffing
van het ouderlijk gezag – enige beschouwingen over de noodzaak van bezinning op en
vernieuwing van de ontneming van gezag’, FJR 1997, nr. 5, pp. 106-114; M.R. Bruning,
Rechtvaardiging van kinderbescherming – naar een nieuw maatregelenpakket na honderd jaar
kinderbescherming (diss. VU Amsterdam), Deventer: Kluwer 2001, p. 421).
174 7 – Discharge of parental authority
2.2 Discharge of parental authority after 1 January 2015
As mentioned above, the care order could be imposed by courts on two
different grounds: (i) unfitness or unwillingness to adequately care for a child
or (ii) intentional misbehaviour of the parents. The effect of a care order,
regardless of the ground used was the same, i.e. discharge of parental author-
ity. Moreover, the second ground (intentional misbehaviour of parents) was
rarely used in practice. These factors contributed to the legislator’s decision
to merge the two grounds into one provision for the new care order (the so-
called ‘discharge of parental authority’). Article 1:266 DCC as in force at the
moment reads:
‘The district court may discharge a parent of parental authority
(a) if a minor grows up in a manner which constitutes a serious threat to his or
her development, and the parent is unable to take responsibility for the child’s
upbringing within a period of time deemed reasonable for the person and the
development of the minor, or
(b) if the parent abuses his or her parental authority.’
This amendment was intended as a simplification of the two different types
of care orders as described above.15 In addition, the legislator aimed to better
balance the care order and the supervision order. Until 2015, without parental
consent a care order on the basis of unfitness or unwillingness of the parent(s),
could only be imposed when a supervision order proved unsuccessful. In
practice a supervision order was only followed by a care order when parents
did not consent to or obstructed a placement in care. This led to long-term
foster care arrangements without legal certainty for the child in alternative
care, even when it was evident that the child could or would no longer go
back to the original caregivers. Since the supervision order aimed to reunite
the parent(s) and the child, the use of a supervision order for long-term foster
care situations was often incongruous and led to many uncertainties for all
parties involved.
The new care order aims at giving room for a direct discharge of parental
authority when it is clear that there is no educational prospect for the child
in the biological family within a period of time deemed reasonable for the
child. Such a situation may occur, for example, when the primary caregiver
of the child is a severe drug abuser and the child is in urgent need of care.16
In this case a supervision order may not be of an added value.
Furthermore, the newwording used for care orders and supervision orders
provides additional insight into the legislator’s intent to better balance these
two measures with the best interests of the child. Thus, a care order may be
15 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 11.
16 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), pp. 11-12.
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imposed ‘if a minor grows up in a manner which constitutes a serious threat
to his or her development, and the parent is unable to care for the child within
a period of time deemed reasonable for the person and the development of
the minor’ (Art. 1:266 DCC). Conversely, a supervision order may be imposed
if ‘a minor grows up in a manner which constitutes a serious threat to his or
her development, and the parent is able to care for the child within a period
of time deemed reasonable for the person and the development of the minor’
(Art. 1:255 DCC).
The phrasing ‘a period of time deemed reasonable for the person and the
development of the minor’ is intended to stimulate that decisions about the
proper child protection order are made from the perspective of the child
instead of the perspective of parental rights.17 Decision-makers have to give
child-specific reasons and must also deal with aspects related to the future
situation of the child, including a time line for permanency planning. It is in
line with current sociological research according to which young children need
swifter permanent decisions about their educational environment and family
situation.18
According to the explanatory memorandum, the interpretation of ‘a time
reasonable [for the child]’ is dependent on the age and development of the
child. The provision was left open intentionally, so as to allow for tailored
approaches without imposing fixed time and age limits for the use of the
supervision or care orders.19
The use of a supervision order for many consecutive years cannot normally
be considered to be in line with the condition of ‘a time reasonable for the
child’. Nevertheless, the explanatorymemorandum says that in order to adhere
to the conditions that follow from Article 8 ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law,
in most situations a supervision order should precede a care order.20 That
is, the use of a care order following an unsuccessful supervision order better
legitimizes why this far-reaching court decision is necessary in order to protect
the child: because professional support aimed at keeping the family together
or reuniting parent and child has failed and the care order thus responds to
the principle of proportionality.
The explanatory memorandum further specifically mentions four factors
that need to be taken into account when imposing a care order (discharge of
parental authority) and when the child is living in foster care:21,22
17 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), pp. 7-9.
18 See e.g. F. Juffer, Beslissingen over kinderen in problematische opvoedingssituaties. Inzichten uit
gehechtheidsonderzoek, Raad voor de Rechtspraak 2010. Download via: http://www.recht
spraak.nl (search: ‘Juffer’).
19 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 34.
20 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 35.
21 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 34.
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‘a. a foster child has the right to a full and harmonious development in foster care;
therefore especially for young children permanency planning in relation to the
educational and developmental perspective of the child is paramount;
b. if reuniting parent(s) and child is no longer feasible or realistic a yearly renewal
of a supervision order will lead to uncertainty for all parties; in principle a
long-term supervision order of several years with a yearly renewal of the court
order is not the appropriate response;
c. the interests of the child to continuity in its upbringing and an undisturbed
secure attachment relation should then prevail;
d. parents’ consent to a placement in foster care of their child should not be
decisive for an imposition of a care order.
If an authorized foundation responsible for the implementation of the super-
vision order requests a children’s court judge to extend the supervision order
with an outplacement of the child after two years, the request should comprise
a recommendation of the Child Protection Board (Art. 1:265j(3) DCC). The Child
Protection Board has been given a new legislative duty to review such requests
and to consider whether an extension of the supervision order for the child
in alternative care is indeed in his or her best interests and meets the ‘time
reasonable for the child’ requirement. The new duty to review long-term
supervision orders for children in alternative care reflects the legislator’s goal
to better respond to the child’s best interests when deciding between a super-
vision order and a care order to protect the child.
Initially, the legislator intended to include a new duty for the Child Pro-
tection Board to have compulsory periodic reviews of whether the actions taken
would best guarantee the rights of the child (Art. 1: 305(1) DCC). This com-
pulsory periodic review was meant to have parties evaluate aspects such as
the efforts made tomove children from residential care to foster care, whether
enough contact was secured between the child and its parents. However, this
legal provision was ultimately not included as it was deemed that the guar-
dianship agencywas already conducting periodic reviews, which would render
an actual legal obligation superfluous.
22 This article takes into account the legislative situation as of January 2015. Even if it does
not form the scope of the present contribution, it should be noted that Dutch case law
published after the drafting of the present contribution shows that courts continue to be
reluctant in using a care order in situations of children in foster care with parents who
cooperate. Although the Dutch legislator has clearly explained that a supervision order
is not fit for situations of permanent foster care, both courts and the Child Protection Board
that is responsible for requesting child protection orders to the court seem to be hesitant
to use a care order when parents cooperate with long-term foster care of their child, even
when it is clear that the child has no future at home; Hof Den Bosch 27 August 2015, ECLI:
GHSHE:2015:3336; Rb. Overijssel 21 April 2015, ECLI:RBOVE:2015:2652. See for a care order
decision that was not preceded by a supervision order to protect the child against further
physical abuse Rb. Amsterdam 17 June 2015, ECLI:RBAMS:2015:3778.
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It should be noted that the possibility of the district court to reinstate a
parent with parental authority remains intact. The reinstatement may occur
upon the parent’s request if the court is convinced that this is in the child’s
best interests and that the parent is able to permanently bear responsibility
for the child’s upbringing (Art. 1:277(1) DCC). The interests of the child are
paramount in these situations. Thus, sometimes, even if the parent meets the
legal requirements to be reinstated with parental authority a court may rule
against it if, for example, the child has been living in a foster family for a long
period of time. Damaging this long-standing situation would be contrary to
the child’s best interests.23
3 DISCHARGE OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY BEFORE THE ECTHR
The previous section analysed the provisions of the new DCC with respect to
discharge of parental authority. It has been shown that the DCC in force as
of 1 January 2015 has brought substantial changes to matters of parental
responsibilities especially by expanding the judges’ discretion when deciding
on discharge of parental duties. This section provides an overview of the case
law of the ECtHR on matters of parental responsibilities. The focus will be on
the requirements which may prove of specific relevance to the Dutch context.
The ECtHR has analysed cases of discharge of parental authority mainly
from the perspective of Article 8 of the ECHR (right to respect for private and
family life). Situations where applicants’ complaints related to procedural
matters such as length of proceedings24 or access to a lawyer25 which are
more typically linked to Article 6 of the ECHR (the right to a fair trial) have
been equally dealt with under Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court has justified
its position by arguing that Article 8 includes implicit procedural guarantees.26
For these reasons, this contribution will focus on the ECtHR’s case law under
Article 8 ECHR.
Further, before going into the case law analysis it is worth recalling that
the main aim of the ECtHR is to secure the effective protection of individual
fundamental rights.27 The principle of effectiveness essentially entails that
‘the Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or
illusory but rights that are practical and effective’.28 This aspect should be
borne in mind when analysing the compatibility of Dutch practice with the
ECtHR case law as the ECtHR will look beyond the formal definition ascribed
23 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 32 015, no. 3 (MvT), p. 37.
24 ECtHR 28 June 2014, no. 40245/10 (X/Slovenia).
25 ECtHR 8 January 2013, no. 37956/11 (A.K. and L/ Croatia).
26 ECtHR 8 January 2013, no. 37956/11 (A.K. and L/Croatia), para 63.
27 ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/99 (Airey/Ireland), para 24.
28 ECtHR 9 October 1979, no. 6289/99 (Airey/Ireland), para 24.
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to certain terms but rather how the discharge of parental authority works in
practice, and what are the consequences in law and in reality of such a meas-
ure.
3.1 The scope of states’ obligations under Article 8 ECHR
Article 8 ECHR provides:
‘1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’
The ECtHR has ruled that Article 8 primarily entails the states’ obligations to
refrain from interfering with family life (negative obligation). Whenever a state
had interfered with family life, such interference would be compatible with
Article 8 ECtHR if it was provided for by law, pursued a legitimate aim (in
these cases usually the rights of others and the protection of health), and it
was necessary in a democratic society, i.e. the reasons adduced for an inter-
ference were relevant and sufficient to the aim pursued. In the context of this
analysis the decision whether there was a violation of Article 8 ECHR or not
would depend onwhether the reasons put forward were relevant and sufficient
(the so-called proportionality analysis), notwithstanding the state’s margin
of appreciation. It is nevertheless worth mentioning that the ‘legality require-
ment’ may sometimes play a role as the ECtHR has developed an autonomous
interpretation of the term ‘provided for by law’.29 Therefore, an interference
does not only need to be provided for by national law, but the national law
in question needs to be clear, accessible and foreseeable. In cases of restriction
of parental rights, the discretion allowed to national authorities by law may
raise certain issues. This matter was raised in Olsson v Sweden where the
applicants complained that the authorities were allowed wide discretionary
powers to intervene whenever the child’s health and development were
jeopardised, without requiring any actual proof of harm.30 However, the ECtHR
did not perceive this wide discretion as incompatible with the Convention
requirements. The ECtHR emphasised that overly strict legal provisions may
29 D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle & M. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights,
Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014
30 ECtHR 24 March 1988, no10465/83 (Olsson/Sweden), para 62.
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interfere with the requirement that authorities intervene efficiently for pro-
tecting children from harm.
Further, in addition to the aforementioned negative obligation, the ECtHR will
analyse whether the decision-making process was fair and ensured due respect
for the interests safeguarded by Article 8 ECHR (procedural obligations).31
As part of this requirement, the ECtHR looks whether the parent(s) and the
children had been given the opportunity to participate in the proceedings,
if they were heard, if they had been represented by an attorney, or if there
were any other obstacles which in practice led to the impossibility to parti-
cipate adequately in the proceedings which led to the removal of parental
rights.
It should also be noted that cases of deprivation of parental rights give
rise to positive obligations of the state. In cases of separation of parents from
their children the positive obligations usually mean that the state needs to
take steps to reunite children with parents. Further, the ECtHR repeatedly stated
that the boundaries between negative and positive obligations do not lend
themselves to precise definition.32
It is worth recalling that the ECtHR’s intervention is limited by the principle
of subsidiarity. One aspect of this principle is the ‘margin of appreciation’
doctrine. The margin of appreciation is essentially used by the ECtHR to refer
to situations where the domestic authorities enjoy certain discretion in dealing
with fundamental rights (see also section 3.2. below). The ECtHR will only
intervene if the domestic authorities have overstepped this discretion.33 Fur-
ther limitation arises from the scope of review of the court. Thus, as repeatedly
stated in its case law, the ECtHR will not act as a court of fourth instance, i.e.
it will not review decisions of national courts unless there was a breach of
a Convention Article.34
The paragraphs above outlined in general lines the states’ obligationswith
respect to family cases under Article 8. The following section shall analyse
the specific principles applicable to cases of separation of children from parents
and deprivation of parental rights.
3.2 Principles for separation and deprivation of parental rights
Usually separation of parents and children precedes deprivation of parental
rights. The basic assumption in the ECtHR’s case law is that separation will
only be temporary, for the least amount of time possible.35 States shouldmake
31 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/Germany), para 94.
32 ECtHR 25 November 2004, no. 23660/02 (Vitters/The Netherlands).
33 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick 2014, on p. 11.
34 Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick 2014, on p. 11
35 ECtHR 18 June 2013, no. 28775/12 (RMS/Spain), para 71.
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efforts to ensure that children are reunited with their parents as soon as
reasonably possible.36 Whenever deprivation of parental rights entails a
permanent severance of the family ties, the state must put forward extra-
ordinary compelling reasons for justifying such a measure.37 Domestic author-
ities need to take into account the child’s best interests at all stages. While the
child’s best interests are a primary consideration in cases of separation, a
permanent severance of family ties (for example by deprivation of parental
rights or putting a child up for adoption) requires an analysis of the child’s
best interests as a paramount consideration.38 Also, the ECtHR stresses that
in some circumstances the interests of children and parents do not coincide
and the best interests of the child override those of the parent(s).39
Further, for all the above measures of separating parents from children,
the states are allowed a certain margin of appreciation. The intervention of
the ECtHR is inversely proportional to the margin of appreciation: the wider
the margin of appreciation, the less intensively will the ECtHR scrutinize the
domestic decisions. In cases of separating children fromparents the ECtHR ruled
that states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the initial
decision to separate.40 However, this margin of appreciation will decrease
with the passage of time, in the sense that the longer the separation, the
weightier the reasons put forward by the state must be.41 Further, when it
comes to newborn babies, extraordinary compelling reasons must exist to
justify a separation from their mothers at birth.42
3.3 Areas of ECtHR intervention
The sections above have outlined the way the ECtHR analyses cases of family
separation and discharge of parental authority and the general principles
applicable thereto. This sectionwill zoom into sensitive areas where the ECtHR
tends to intensify its scrutiny.
36 ECtHR 18 June 2013, no. 28775/12 (RMS/Spain), para 71.
37 ECtHR 27 June 1996, no. 17383/90 (Johansen/ Norway) and ECtHR 28 October 2010, no.
52502/07(Aune/ Norway). It should be noted that these cases entailed deprivation of parental
rights and authorization for adoption of the children.
38 ECtHR 28 October 2010, no. 52502/07 (Aune/ Norway), ECtHR, 13 March 2012, no. 4547/10
(YC/ UK).
39 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/ Germany), para 93.
40 ECtHR 17 July 2012, no. 64791/10 (M.D. and Others/Malta), para 71.
41 ECtHR 17 July 2012, no. 64791/10 (M.D. and Others/Malta), para 71.
42 ECtHR 12 July 2001, no. 25702/94 (K. and T./ Finland), para 168. In this paper we do not
focus on emergency protection orders.
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First, with specific relevance for Dutch practice it is worth recalling that
ECtHR has so far issued one inadmissibility decision.43 The case concerned
the relieving of a father of his parental authority due to criminal proceedings
against him and the authorities’ subsequent refusal to reinstate him to his
parental rights (following his acquittal of criminal charges). The ECtHR declared
inadmissible the complaint about the deprivation of parental rights for non-
observance of the six-month time limit. As to the complaint regarding the
restoration of parental rights, the ECtHR dismissed it asmanifestly ill-founded.
The Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the applicant had not
been denied contact with his children. It further held that the domestic de-
cisions had been fully reasoned and that the Dutch authorities acted within
their margin of appreciation.
However, notwithstanding a state’s margin of appreciation, there are
situations where the ECtHR looksmore closely at the decision-making process.
The ECtHR repeatedly noted that ‘the fact that a child could be placed in a more
beneficial environment for its upbringing will not on its own justify a com-
pulsory measure of removal from the care of the biological parents’.44 In view
of this principle ECtHR found violations where parents were separated from
their children on account of the parents’ financial situation45 or intellectual
capacity.46 In these cases it was deemed that the domestic authorities should
have looked into alternative means of overcoming these difficulties, without
resorting to (prolonged) family separation. Also, in the aforementioned cases
ECtHR stressed that there had been no allegations of ill treatment of the
children.47
Further, whenever deprivation of parental authority was applied automatic-
ally as a consequence of criminal convictions of the applicant, without domestic
courts havingweighed in concretowhether themeasurewas in the best interests
of the children concerned, the ECtHR has equally found violations of Article 8
ECHR.48
It is also important to note that even though states enjoy a wide margin
of appreciation when it comes to the initial decision to separate, this does not
mean that the ECtHRwill refrain from reviewing domestic decisions all together.
In a case where such initial decision to separate was taken against the back-
43 ECtHR 25 November 2004, no. 23660/02 (Vitters/The Netherlands). One other relevant
judgment against the Netherlands concerning separation of a child from its parents rather
than deprivation of parental rights is ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The
Netherlands). This judgment will be analysed in more detail in the paragraphs below.
44 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner/Germany), para 69.
45 ECtHR 18 June 2013, no. 28775/12 (RMS v. Spain); ECtHR 26 October 2006, no. 23848/04
(Wallova and Walla/Czech Republic).
46 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner/Germany).
47 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner/Germany).
48 ECtHR 28 September 2004, no. 46572/99 (Sabou and Pircalab/Romania), para 48; ECtHR 17
July 2012, no. 64791/10 (M.D. and Others/Malta), para 77.
182 7 – Discharge of parental authority
ground of an apparent conflict between a social worker and the applicants,
the ECtHR assessed whether the national authorities had been entitled ‘to
consider that there existed circumstances justifying the abrupt removal of the
child from the care of the parents without any prior contact and consultation’
of the parents.49 On the facts of the case, it found that the authorities had
not properly justified the urgency of the situation, and did not adequately
consider whether there was a risk of harm to the children.50
Moreover, as to the decision-making process, previous case law demon-
strates that particular emphasis will be placed on the domestic courts admin-
istration and evaluation of evidence as well as to the degree of the parties’
involvement into the decision making process.51 Thus, for example if the
reports administered by psychologists or psychiatrists are conflicting, regard-
less of whether some of those reports had been filed by the applicants them-
selves, the ECtHR tends to reinforce the presumption against parental sep-
aration/ deprivation of parental rights.52 It is important that decisions of social
workers and other authorities involved are scrutinized by domestic courts.53
Even if the child was heard by administrative authorities and such child was
opposed to contact with a parent, absence of a court scrutiny of the admin-
istrative proceedings is likely to tilt the balance in favour of the aggrieved
parent.54 Conversely, not hearing the parents or not involving them in the
process may trigger a violation of Article 8. The case of Venema v. The Nether-
lands is illustrative in this sense.55 In this case the Dutch authorities, suspicious
of themother suffering of amental illness imposed a supervision order where-
by the applicants’ one year old daughter was placed in foster care. The order
was issued without informing or hearing the parents. In its reasoning, the
ECtHR placed considerable weight on the absence of involvement of the parents.
In this context, it stated that it must ‘be satisfied that the national authorities
were entitled to consider that there existed circumstances to justifying the
abrupt removal of the child from the care of its parents without any prior
contact or consultation’.56 On the facts of the case, the Court did not consider
that the alleged ‘unpredictable reaction’ of the parents was on its own a
sufficient justification for excluding them from the procedure.57 It should be
stressed that the Court did not find a violation on account of the supervision
order per se, but rather as the parents were faced with such an order without
49 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/ Germany), para 93.
50 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/ Germany), para 97.
51 ECtHR 8 July 2004, no. 11057/02 (Haase/ Germany); ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99
(Kutzner v. Germany).
52 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner/Germany).
53 ECtHR 17 July 2014, no. 19315/11 (T./ Czech Republic), para 126.
54 ECtHR 17 July 2014, no. 19315/11 (T./ Czech Republic), para 126.
55 ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The Netherlands).
56 ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The Netherlands), para 93.
57 ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The Netherlands), para 96.
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having the possibility to submit their comments or evidence beforehand.58
Even if this case does not concern deprivation of parental rights as in this case
the family was eventually reunited, it nevertheless sheds light on the proced-
ural aspects the Court takes into account in its reasoning.
Furthermore, contact between a parent and child is of the utmost import-
ance to the ECtHR, as in the absence of contact, separation may lead to an
impossibility to resume family life. In this respect, the Court has also ruled
that there should be a periodic ex officio review of the situation in order to
assess whether such separation is still warranted or whether contact is
possible.59
It follows that national authorities are required to conduct careful and
personalized assessments of the individual situations bearing in mind the
principle that separation should be seen as a temporary measure and its
application necessary only whenever other measures are not suitable in the
individual circumstances of the case.
4 IMPACT OF THE ECTHR CASE LAW ON DUTCH LEGISLATION AND PRACTICE
Sections 2 and 3 above outlined the Dutch present and past legislation and
practice on matters of parental authority and the relevant ECtHR case law,
respectively. It has been shown that the beginning of 2015 marked what
appears to be a significant change in the Dutch legislation on discharge of
parental authority. The aim was to replace the current prevailing practice of
imposing temporary supervision orders in cases where the possibility to reunite
children with their biological parents is remote. Thus, the conditions for
instituting care orders have been relaxed in the sense that the current legis-
lation allows for more judicial discretion for discharge of parental authority
(i.e. the care orders). Importantly, a new criterion of ‘reasonable time’ has been
introduced which should be one determining factor for the decision-making
process. As per this new criterion, a supervision order is to be imposed if the
judge deems the parent(s) able to resume their responsibility for the child
within a reasonable time. Conversely, a care order (entailing discharge of
parental authority) should be imposed if the parents are unable to care for
the child within a reasonable time. In the absence of any legal provision it
will be for courts to determine on a case-by-case basis the amount of time
needed for the ‘reasonableness criterion’.
The ECtHR, on the other hand, has on several occasions examined matters
of separation between parents and children and discharge of parental authority.
Even if in these cases the factual context is of high relevance, several principles
and areas to which the Court tends to pay particular attention can be distilled
58 ECtHR 17 December 2002, 35731/97 (Venema / The Netherlands), para 96.
59 ECtHR 17 July 2014, no. 19315/11 (T./ Czech Republic), para 128.
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from its case law. In this section an attempt is made to point out the implica-
tions of ECtHR’s rulings for Dutch future practice in light of new legislation.
One aspect that merits brief attention is the ‘legality’ requirement under
the ECtHR. As discussed, interferences in private life need to be provided for
by law and the law shouldmeet conditions of clarity, accessibility and foresee-
ability. Since the newDutch care order grants significant discretion to domestic
courts in assessing the need to impose the measure, it is possible that a
challenge will be brought as to the foreseeability of this law. However, it is
not likely that such a challengewill succeed as especially inmatters of parental
authority the ECtHR perceives discretion as an inherent element in the decision-
making process.60
The core aspects which may trigger a more intensive scrutiny or potential
infringements of Article 8 on the part of the ECtHR will probably relate to the
manner of implementation of the care order and to the application in practice
of ‘the reasonable time’ requirement.
As to the manner of implementation, it should be pointed out that there
is no clear legal requirement in the new DCC to the effect that a care order
is to be applied only after unsuccessful supervision order(s).61 Therefore, since
the care order entails relief of parental authority and it is as such a more far-
reaching measure, imposing such a care order directly will be more difficult
to justify in line with the ECtHR principle that separation is to be temporary
and family reunification should be ordered as soon as reasonably possible.
Clearly, weighty reasons need to be adduced in support of the argument that
family reunification was not foreseeable in view of the concrete circumstances.
Asmentioned above, one example put forward by the legislator in the explan-
atory memorandum is that of a heavy drug user. In that case, according to
the explanatory memorandum, a care order would be better suited for the
child than a supervision order. In this regard, it should be noted that in
previous case law the ECtHR placed strong emphasis on improvements in the
situation of the parents. In those cases, the ECtHR did not accept the argument
of separation based on past conduct of the parent(s), where they showed signs
of improvement.62 The Court looked at whether the authorities made genuine
efforts aimed at family reunification. The success or failure of such a claim
will depend on the domestic arrangements for contact and on the chances of
success for the parent to regain parental authority if the situation improves.
It bears stressing that the ECtHR has always placed importance on contact
arrangements between parent and child. Put differently, regular contact should
not be withdrawn, especially if there are no allegations of violence of the
parent to the child.
60 ECtHR 24 March 1988, 10465/83 (Olsson/Sweden), discussed in section 3.1. above.
61 As discussed in section 2 above, at the moment the explanatory memorandum contains
an indication to this effect, but this is not binding on domestic courts.
62 ECtHR 12 July 2001, no. 25702/94 (K. and T./Finland), para 179.
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Further, some remarks should bemadewith respect to the ‘reasonable time’
requirement in the new DCC. Even if this is an aspect to be determined on a
case-by-case basis, national decision-makers should not lose sight of the
ultimate aim: to reunite parents with children. Thus, supervision measures
should be temporary and it must be shown that regular efforts were made
to reunite families. Also, in line with European case law, domestic authorities
are to undertake these efforts of their ownmotion, and not only at the request
of an interested party. The longer the separation, the closer will the ECtHR
scrutinize whether genuine efforts were made to bring parents and children
back together. In this vain it is worth recalling that the ECtHR has repeatedly
stressed that the best interests of the child do not always coincide with those
of the parents and that in cases of conflict the former override the latter. From
this perspective, it can be argued that the new DCC is more attuned to the
requirements of Article 8 ECtHR as successive prolongations of supervision
orders without ensuring permanency for children can hardly be considered
to serve their best interests. In these circumstances children may form bonds
with the foster family and these bonds deserve adequate legal protection. It
will be for the domestic judges to adequately balance all the interests at stake
and to ensure that the child’s best interests are observed. It is important that
throughout the duration of a supervision order authorities show that a genuine
effort wasmade to reunite families, that forensic evidence (such as psychiatric,
psychological reports etc.) was duly considered by domestic courts and that
evidence of, for example, improvement in the personal situationswas not easily
dismissed. The ECtHR has repeatedly stressed that the fact that the child is
placed in a more beneficial environment cannot on its own justify a child’s
removal from its biological family.63
One other aspect to be noted is that foster parents could also benefit from
the protection of Article 8 ECHR. This contribution focusedmainly on the right
to respect for family life of biological parents with their children who are
placed into care. However, long-term fostering agreements trigger family bonds
between foster parents and children.64 These foster parents too may claim
a breach of family life if, for example, supervision orders last unreasonably
long in spite of lack of evidence of improvement of the situation of the bio-
logical parent which triggered the placement of children into care.65 In this
sense, the aim of the new DCC to put a stop to uncertainties for foster families
is arguably more in line with the requirements of Article8, seen from the
perspective of foster parents.
63 ECtHR 26 February 2002, no. 46544/99 (Kutzner /Germany), para 69.
64 ECtHR 17 January 2012, 1598/06 (Kopf and Liberda/ Austria).
65 The scenario envisaged in that situation is not that of a separation between foster parents
and children but rather a situation where they would claim that the uncertainty of a
situation (triggered for example by yearly prolongations of supervision orders or other
related measures) goes against the principle of legal certainty which is embedded in their
right to respect for family life.
186 7 – Discharge of parental authority
5 CONCLUSION
Aspects related to (deprivation of) parental rights are not only private family
matters. While it is mainly for national authorities to regulate how and when
intervention is necessary, such intervention needs to observe the general
principles of the ECHR, in particular Article 8. The ECtHR will exercise its
supervision in line with themargin of appreciation doctrine and the subsidiar-
ity principle. Moreover, cases of placing children into care are highly factual,
which poses certain difficulties for forecasting in abstract the implication of
the new DCC in the light of Article 8 ECHR.
However, this contribution sought to highlight themain aspects of the new
Dutch Civil Code against the principles distilled from the ECtHR case law. Even
if the ultimate assessment will be based on actual facts, it is nevertheless
important for domestic authorities to take into account these principles when
deciding on concrete cases.
Thus, in the light of the analysis above, one aspect whichmay prove highly
problematic is the possibility of imposing care orders directly, without having
them preceded by a supervision order. For such situations to comply with
the ECHR, the Dutch courts would have to show that there was clearly no
possibility for the parent(s) to improve their situation so as to resume family
life with the child. Also, if such imposition results in a lack of efforts on the
part of the authorities to assist in family reunification, it may entail a strong
adverse reaction from the ECtHR. In the same vein, the ‘reasonable time’ re-
quirement may face some scrutiny from the ECtHR, depending on how it is
assessed by national courts. Periods of separation should be accompanied by
the authorities’ efforts to reunite children with their parents. In their efforts
the authorities must show that they have effectively tried to achieve such
reunification, which was ultimately not possible. Last but not least, parties
should be offered reasonable opportunities to present their case and submit
evidence. While it may be acceptable not to involve the parents/children in
emergency situations, such justifications will be less compelling with the
passage of time. Also, the Court will most likely look into the actual circum-
stances, i.e. so as to assess whether a particular circumstance was indeed of
an emergency nature. As to the hearing of parties, both children and parents
are to be heard, but when it comes to children, aspects such as their age and
maturity will play a significant role in the Court’s review of the domestic
decision-making process.
